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Best-reply matching in games
Abstract
We study a new equilibrium concept in non-cooperative games, where players follow a behavioral rule
called best-reply matching. Under this rule a player matches the probability of playing a pure strategy to
the probability that this strategy is a best reply. Kosfeld, Droste, and Voorneveld [Games and Economic
Behavior 40 (2002) 270] show that best-reply matching equilibria are stationary states in a simple model
of social learning, where newborns adopt a best-reply to recent observations of play. In this paper we
analyze best-reply matching in more detail and illustrate the concept by means of well-known examples.
For example in the centipede game it is shown that players will continue with large probability.
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“Learning theory, on the one hand, and game theory
(...), on the other, both purport to provide theories of
‘rational’ behavior. (...) It would be interesting, in or-
der to gain a better understanding of the concepts of
‘rationality’ underlying these two bodies of theory, to
construct a situation in which their predictions of be-
havior could be compared, and in which these predic-
tions, in turn, could be compared with experimental
data on actual behavior.”
— Herbert A. Simon (1957)
1 Introduction
This paper studies a new equilibrium concept for ﬁnite n-player non-cooperative games,
called best-reply matching equilibrium. In a best-reply matching equilibrium each player
chooses a pure strategy with a probability equal to the probability that this pure strategy
is a best reply to a pure strategy proﬁle chosen by the opponents. The new concept is
interesting for two reasons. First, as we show in this paper, it provides a possible solution
to one of the best known puzzles in game theory: the centipede game. Second, as shown
in Kosfeld, Droste, and Voorneveld (2002) best-reply matching equilibria naturally arise as
stationary states in a simple learning model in non-cooperative games. While the result for
the centipede game is interesting in itself, the learning model is our main motivation for
studying the new equilibrium concept.
Kosfeld, Droste, and Voorneveld (2002) show that best-reply matching equilibria are
stationary states in a social learning model where, following the standard framework, each
player is represented by an inﬁnite population of agents that are programmed to pure strate-
gies. Every period a fraction of agents dies and is replaced by newborns. Social learning is
driven by the assumption that newborns adopt a best-reply to the outcome of play that is
observed in the last period. In case of multiple best replies each best reply is chosen equally
likely. Alternatively, the learning process can be derived from a probabilistic learning model
where players positively reinforce their best replies to the observed outcomes of play. (We
give a precise description of the learning model in Section 3.)
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Independent of the interpretation, the prediction for the learning model in ﬁnite time,
and in particular cases also asymptotically, is best-reply matching equilibrium. Though the
latter shares some features with Nash equilibrium, the two concepts typically diﬀer from each
other. The main purpose of this paper is therefore to study the new equilibrium concept in
more detail. In particular, our results include the following:
• Existence. Every ﬁnite n-player non-cooperative game has at least one best-reply
matching equilibrium (Proposition 3).
• Rationality. Best-reply matching equilibria survive iterated elimination of pure strate-
gies that are never a best reply to any pure strategy proﬁle of the opponents (Propo-
sition 5). Furthermore, any pure strategy that receives positive weight in a best-reply
matching equilibrium is rationalizable. However, the equilibrium mixed strategy may
fail to be rationalizable.
• Structure. In two-player games every minimal curb set contains the support of a
unique best-reply matching equilibrium. Consequently, the set of best-reply matching
equilibria has dimension equal to the number of minimal curb sets minus one (Propo-
sition 7).
Our result for the centipede game is as follows. Given in reduced normal form we show
that the centipede game possesses a unique best-reply matching equilibrium, which has two
basic features:
• each player continues with positive probability at every node but the probability to
stop increases as players reach further nodes of the game,
• as the number of nodes goes to inﬁnity the probability to stop at the ﬁrst node, and
in the same way to stop at any ﬁxed node, converges to zero.
This equilibrium prediction corresponds to the observations made in laboratory experi-
ments on the centipede game (McKelvey and Palfrey (1992), Nagel and Tang (1998)), sug-
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gesting that best-reply matching equilibrium can be a powerful and predictive solution con-
cept.
Best-reply matching equilibrium considers a particular form of matching behavior. Gen-
erally, the term matching stands for the observation that an individual chooses an alternative
from a given set of alternatives with a probability proportional to the value derived from
that alternative. For example, suppose the individual has a ﬁnite set of alternatives S and
v(s) ∈ R denotes the value of any alternative s ∈ S. Then matching means that s is chosen
with probability equal to v(s)/
∑
s∈S v(s). In our model of best-reply matching the individu-
als are the players in an n-player game, alternatives are given by the set of pure strategies of
each player, and the value of each alternative is equal to the probability that this alternative
is a best reply to the pure strategy proﬁle chosen by the opponents.
Matching was ﬁrst observed and analyzed in psychological studies of human learning,
following the seminal paper of Estes (1950). See Davison and McCarthy (1988), Williams
(1988), Herrnstein (1997), and Vulkan (2000) for recent collections and discussions of the
ﬁndings. Whereas psychologists have concluded from these studies that the “generality
of the matching relation has been conﬁrmed by a large number of diﬀerent experiments”,
and that “[a]pparently, the matching relation is a general law of choice” (Williams (1988,
p178)), economists have largely remained sceptical towards these observations. The typical
argument put forward by economists is that matching will disappear as soon as individuals
receive strong ﬁnancial incentives, regular feedback, and extensive training. In a recent
paper, Shanks, Tunney, and McCarthy (2002) have tried to challenge matching behavior
building exactly on this argument. They provide individuals with a well-designed learning
environment that includes proper incentives and possibilities for learning. While the authors
do indeed observe that more subjects learn to behave rationally, they also ﬁnd that about a
third of the subjects persistently continue to match probabilities, “despite the fact that this
lost them money” (Shanks, Tunney, and McCarthy (2002, p242)).
We take from these studies that matching seems to be more than simply erratic and
unstable behavior. Instead, it appears in so many settings and environments that we believe
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economists should not ignore the concept but rather develop a theoretical framework, which
allows for both matching behavior and more rational types of behavior. Research that goes
into that direction includes the work by Bo¨rgers and Sarin (1997, 2000) and Kosfeld, Droste,
and Voorneveld (2002). The present article builds on the latter and analyzes the resulting
equilibrium behavior in more detail.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 deﬁnes the class of games we consider in
this paper. Section 3 formally deﬁnes the concept of best-reply matching equilibrium and
provides an interpretation based on the learning model of Kosfeld, Droste, and Voorneveld
(2002). Section 4 contains an analysis of best-reply matching equilibrium. The centipede
game is studied in Section 5. Finally, Section 6 concludes.
2 Preliminaries
A non-cooperative game is a tuple G = 〈N, (Si)i∈N , (i)i∈N〉, where N = {1, . . . , n} is a
ﬁnite set of players, each player i ∈ N has a ﬁnite set Si of pure strategies, henceforth called
actions, and a binary relation i over
∏
i∈N Si, reﬂecting his preferences over the outcomes.
The binary relation i is assumed to be reﬂexive and its asymmetric part i, deﬁned for all
s, t ∈∏i∈N Si by
s i t ⇔ [s i t and not t i s],
is assumed to be acyclic. In order to compare the notion of best-reply matching equilibrium
to other concepts, like mixed Nash equilibrium and rationalizability, we also consider cases
in which the preference relations i induce von Neumann-Morgenstern utility functions
ui :
∏
i∈N Si → R and denote the corresponding game by G = 〈N, (Si)i∈N , (ui)i∈N〉. This
assumption, however, is not necessary for the deﬁnition and existence of best-reply matching
equilibrium. For notational convenience we write S =
∏
i∈N Si, S−i =
∏
j∈N\{i} Sj. For an
action tuple s = (s1, . . . , sn) ∈ S we denote s−i = (s1, . . . , si−1, si+1, . . . , sn) and, with a
slight abuse of notation, s = (si, s−i). We denote by
∆i := {σi : Si → R | ∀si ∈ Si : σi(si) ≥ 0,
∑
si∈Si
σi(si) = 1}
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the set of mixed strategies, henceforth called strategies, for player i. Analogously to the
action case, we use notations ∆ =
∏
i∈N ∆i, ∆−i =
∏
j∈N\{i} ∆j, σ = (σi, σ−i). For a
strategy proﬁle σ−i, we write σ−i(s−i) :=
∏
j∈N\{i} σj(sj), the probability that the opponents
of player i play action proﬁle s−i ∈ S−i. We restrict attention to independent strategy
proﬁles.
Consider a game G = 〈N, (Si)i∈N , (i)i∈N〉. Denote for each player i ∈ N and each
proﬁle s−i ∈ S−i of actions of his opponents the set of pure best replies, i.e., the actions that
player i cannot improve upon, by Bi(s−i):
Bi(s−i) := {si ∈ Si | ∃s˜i ∈ Si : (s˜i, s−i) i (si, s−i)}.
Of course, for games 〈N, (Si)i∈N , (ui)i∈N〉 with utility functions we have:
Bi(s−i) := {si ∈ Si | ∀s˜i ∈ Si : ui(si, s−i) ≥ ui(s˜i, s−i)}.
Since Si is ﬁnite and i is acyclic, Bi(s−i) is nonempty. We call an action si ∈ Si a never-best
reply if
B−1i (si) := {s−i ∈ S−i | si ∈ Bi(s−i)} = ∅.
For a game 〈N, (Si)i∈N , (ui)i∈N〉 we have that si ∈ Si is a never-best reply if
ui(si, s−i) < max
s˜i∈Si
ui(s˜i, s−i)
for each s−i ∈ S−i. An action si ∈ Si is weakly dominated by a strategy σi ∈ ∆i if
∀s−i ∈ S−i : ui(σi, s−i) ≥ ui(si, s−i)
with strict inequality for at least one s−i, and strictly dominated if all inequalities are strict.
A strictly dominated action is clearly a never-best reply. We next deﬁne best-reply matching
behavior and best-reply matching equilibrium.
3 Definition and Interpretation
Consider a game G = 〈N, (Si)i∈N , (ui)i∈N〉 and some player i ∈ N . To every action si ∈ Si
of player i we associate the set B−1i (si) of all action proﬁles of player i’s opponents to which
action si is a best reply.
6
Note that we consider best-replies to action proﬁles and not to strategy proﬁles. In
consequence, B−1i (si) = ∅ if action si is not a best reply to any proﬁle of the opponents
or if si is a best reply to some mixed strategy proﬁle only. Indeed, if players have von
Neumann-Morgenstern utility functions much information may be ignored by focusing only
on the above best-reply structure of the game. In particular, cardinal issues do not enter a
player’s consideration. Best-reply matching is an ordinal concept.
The term matching refers to the way how players use their beliefs about their opponents
behavior to determine their own behavior, i.e. the strategy being played. We assume that
additional to the information on the game each player i ∈ N has a belief about his opponents’
behavior. This belief is given by a strategy σˆ−i ∈ ∆−i determining for each action proﬁle
s−i ∈ S−i the probability σˆ−i(s−i) with which player i believes that particular proﬁle to occur.
Best-reply matching says that a player builds his own strategy by matching his individual
probability to play an action to the probability that this action is a best reply . We obtain the
following deﬁnition.
Definition 1 Let G = 〈N, (Si)i∈N , (i)i∈N〉 be a game. Consider a player i ∈ N . Let
σˆ−i ∈ ∆−i be the strategy profile player i believes his opponents to play. Player i matches
best replies if for every si ∈ Si:
σi(si) =
∑
s−i∈B−1i (si)
1
|Bi(s−i)| σˆ−i(s−i). (1)
Dividing by |Bi(s−i)| in (1) we take care of multiple best replies and guarantee that σi is
indeed well-deﬁned, i.e. probabilities sum up to one. Implicitly, it is thereby assumed that
all multiple best replies are weighted equally. However, it should be clear that any other
weighting rule would be ﬁne too, although changing, of course, the probabilities assigned to
actions. If best replies are unique the weighting rule is obviously irrelevant.
In a best-reply matching equilibrium every player matches best replies and beliefs are
correct, i.e. for all i ∈ N, σˆ−i = σ−i.
Definition 2 Let G = 〈N, (Si)i∈N , (i)i∈N〉 be a game. A mixed strategy profile σ ∈ ∆ is
a best-reply matching (BRM) equilibrium if for every player i ∈ N and for every
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si ∈ Si:
σi(si) =
∑
s−i∈B−1i (si)
1
|Bi(s−i)|σ−i(s−i). (2)
The set of BRM equilibria of a game G is denoted by BRM(G).
We can give two possible interpretations of best-reply matching equilibrium. The ﬁrst is
a common static interpretation, where players are assumed to match best replies given their
beliefs and beliefs are assumed to be correct. While this interpretation has the advantage
of being simple it fails to explain why players should match best replies in the ﬁrst place.
Moreover, even if players match best replies it remains unclear why beliefs should be correct.
There exists, however, a second interpretation, which solves these problems in an elegant
way by explicitly considering a social (or individual) learning process that leads players to
best-reply matching given the observed behavior of the opponents. The learning process has
been further explored in Kosfeld, Droste, and Voorneveld (2002) and is as follows.
Suppose there exist n inﬁnitely large populations of agents, each corresponding to a
particular player position in the underlying game G. Suppose furthermore that the game
is repeated over inﬁnitely many periods. In any period k ∈ N0 each agent in population
i ∈ N is programmed to some action si ∈ Si. The fraction of agents in population i that are
programmed to action si in period k ∈ N0 is denoted by σki (si).
Each period k ∈ N0 a fraction θ > 0 of agents in every population i ∈ N are randomly
drawn to play the game G. Agents who are called to play the game are randomly matched in
n-tuples such that each agent is matched with exactly one agent from every other population.
After all n-tuples of agents have played the game these agents leave the system and are
replaced by new agents. New agents choose their action by sampling exactly one outcome
of play from the last period and adopting a best-reply to this outcome. In case of multiple
best-replies new agents adopt each best-reply with equal probability.
More precisely, suppose that new agents who enter the system in period k sample the
action proﬁle s ∈ S. Then each agent who replaces an agent exiting population i chooses
a best reply to the action proﬁle s−i ∈ S−i, with multiple best-replies being chosen equally
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likely. In consequence, in period k+1 the fraction of agents in population i being programmed
to action si is equal to (1 − θ)σki (si) + θ|Bi(s−i)| if si ∈ Bi(s−i) and equal to (1 − θ)σki (si)
otherwise. We thus obtain the following adjustment rule.
σk+1i (si) =


(1− θ)σki (si) + θ|Bi(s−i)| if si ∈ Bi(s−i),
(1− θ)σki (si) otherwise.
(3)
Equation (3) deﬁnes a social learning process that is a discrete-time Markov process with
inﬁnite state space ∆.
Instead of considering a model of social learning, it is easy to see that adjustment rule (3)
can also be derived from a probabilistic learning model of n players repeatedly playing the
game G. In this model each player’s behavior at time k is characterized by some strategy
σki , i ∈ N . After realization of action proﬁle s every player reinforces each of his best
replies to the observed strategy proﬁle by θ|Bi(s−i)| . Similar to other models of reinforcement
learning (e.g. Roth and Erev (1995), Erev and Roth (1998), Bo¨rgers and Sarin (1997))
players positively reinforce “good” actions and negatively reinforce “bad” actions. However,
while in the standard model an action is “good” if it leads to a high payoﬀ in this model an
action is “good” if it is a best reply to a recent observation.
A detailed analysis of the Markov process deﬁned by adjustment rule (3) is contained
in Kosfeld, Droste, and Voorneveld (2002). There it is shown that, if one approximates the
learning process by a dynamical system of deterministic diﬀerential equations that follows
the expected movement of the learning process, the steady states of the dynamical system
are exactly the best-reply matching equilibria of the game G. The dynamical system serves
as a good approximation for the behavior of the Markov process in ﬁnite time. In ﬁnite two
player games the set BRM(G) is asymptotically stable and each equilibrium is Lyapunov
stable. Analyzing the asymptotic behavior of the Markov process it is shown that (i) the
process converges to the (faces of the) minimal curb sets of G with probability one, and (ii)
absorbing states, if they exist, are best-reply matching equilibria of G. Moreover, best-reply
matching equilibria are contained in the (faces of the) minimal curb sets of G.
Overall, the prediction for the learning rule (3) leads — both in ﬁnite time and in some
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cases also asymptotically — to best-reply matching equilibrium. As we will see, while in
some cases best-reply matching equilibria can well be Nash equilibria of the game G, in
general the two concepts diﬀer substantially from each other. We now come to the analysis
of the new equilibrium concept.
4 Analysis
A fundamental question with respect to any equilibrium concept concerns its existence. The
ﬁrst proposition shows that BRM equilibria exist for every game.
Proposition 3 Let G = 〈N, (Si)i∈N , (i)i∈N〉 be a game. Then BRM(G) = ∅.
Proof. Let i ∈ N, σ ∈ ∆, and si ∈ Si. Deﬁne, analogous to (2):
ri(si, σ−i) :=
∑
s−i∈B−1i (si)
1
|Bi(s−i)|σ−i(s−i).
Applying the Brouwer ﬁxed-point theorem to the function r : ∆ → ∆ that assigns to each
σ ∈ ∆ the mixed strategy proﬁle r(σ) ∈ ∆ with r(σ)i(si) := ri(si, σ−i) for each i ∈ N and
si ∈ Si, there is a σ∗ ∈ ∆ such that σ∗ = r(σ∗), which is a BRM equilibrium. 
Remark 4 Notice that
∑
si∈Si σi(si) = 1 =
∑
si∈Si ri(si, σ−i) for each σ ∈ ∆ and i ∈ N . As
a consequence, when computing BRM equilibria, one of the conditions σi(si) = ri(si, σ−i) of
each player i is redundant. 
A game H is said to be obtained by iterated elimination of never-best replies from a game
G = 〈N, (Si)i∈N , (i)i∈N〉 if there exists a number k ∈ N of elimination rounds and for each
player i ∈ N a collection of sets S0i , S1i , . . . , Ski and a sequence 0i ,1i , . . . ,ki of relations
such that:
1. For each player i ∈ N : Si = S0i ⊇ S1i ⊇ · · · ⊇ Ski ;
2. For each player i ∈ N and each l = 0, 1, . . . , k: li is the preference relation i from
the game G restricted to
∏
j∈N S
l
j;
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3. For each l = 0, 1, . . . , k − 1 and each player i ∈ N the set Sli \ Sl+1i contains only
never-best replies of player i in the game 〈N, (Sli)i∈N , (li)i∈N〉 and there exists at least
one player i ∈ N for which Sli \ Sl+1i is nonempty;
4. H is the game 〈N, (Ski )i∈N , (ki )i∈N〉;
5. In the game H, no player i ∈ N has never-best replies.
The next proposition indicates the robustness of best-reply matching equilibria with
respect to the (iterated) elimination of never-best replies.
Proposition 5 The following results hold:
(i) In a BRM equilibrium σ∗ of a game 〈N, (Si)i∈N , (i)i∈N〉 never-best replies are played
with zero probability.
(ii) The set of BRM equilibria of a game G = 〈N, (Si)i∈N , (i)i∈N〉 equals — up to zero
probability assigned to eliminated actions — the set of BRM equilibria of a game that
is obtained by iterated elimination of never-best replies.
(iii) Let G = 〈N, (Si)i∈N , (ui)i∈N〉 be a game with von Neumann-Morgenstern utility func-
tions and let σ∗ be a BRM equilibrium of G. If player i’s action si is weakly dominated
by the strategy σi, then:
for all si ∈ Si : if σi(si) > 0, then σ∗i (si) ≥ σ∗i (si).
Proof. The proof of (i) is easy: if si ∈ Si is a never-best reply, then the set B−1i (si) is empty
and hence according to (2): σ∗i (si) = ri(si, σ
∗
−i) = 0.
To prove (ii), it suﬃces to prove that the ﬁrst round of eliminations does not change the
equilibrium set, since the proof can then be repeated for the additional rounds. Assume for
simplicity that in this ﬁrst elimination round we eliminate all the never-best replies
NBi := {si ∈ Si | si is a never-best reply of player i in G}
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of each player i ∈ N , thus obtaining a smaller game G′. The equilibrium conditions in the
game G are that for each i ∈ N and each si ∈ Si:
σi(si) = ri(si, σ−i)
=
∑
s−i∈B−1i (si)
1
|Bi(s−i)|σ−i(s−i)
=
∑
{s−i∈B−1i (si)|sj /∈NBj for each j∈N\{i}}
1
|Bi(s−i)|σ−i(s−i)
+
∑
{s−i∈B−1i (si)|sj∈NBj for some j∈N\{i}}
1
|Bi(s−i)|σ−i(s−i).
By (i), actions sj ∈ NBj are played with zero probability in a BRM equilibrium. Hence the
second sum in the last equality above equals zero. What remains, for each player i ∈ N and
each action si ∈ Si \NBi, are exactly the equilibrium conditions for the game G′.
To prove (iii), we show that for each si ∈ Si with σi(si) > 0 it holds that
B−1i (si) ⊆ B−1i (si). (4)
Let s−i ∈ B−1i (si). Since σi weakly dominates si and si ∈ Bi(s−i), the mixed strategy σ∗i is
a best reply to s−i, so for every si ∈ Si with σi(si) > 0 it must be that si ∈ Bi(s−i), proving
(4). Together with the deﬁnition of ri(·, σ∗−i) this implies the result:
σi(si) > 0 ⇒ σ∗i (si) = ri(si, σ∗−i)
=
∑
s−i∈B−1i (si)
1
|Bi(s−i)|σ
∗
−i(s−i)
≥ ∑s−i∈B−1i (si) 1|Bi(s−i)|σ∗−i(s−i)
= ri(si, σ
∗
−i)
= σ∗i (si).

The result above does not rule out that weakly dominated actions are played with pos-
itive, even quite large probability. Consider the game in Figure 1. T weakly dominates B
and L strictly dominates R. Both, T and B are a best reply against L, and T is a unique
best reply against R.
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L R
T 1, 1 1, 0
B 1, 1 0, 0
Figure 1: Weak dominance
Hence in equilibrium we have the condition that
σ1(T ) =
1
2
σ2(L) + σ2(R).
The condition for σ1(B) is redundant, since probabilities add up to one (Remark 4). Simi-
larly, for player 2 we see that L is a unique best reply to both T and B, so that his equilibrium
condition becomes
σ2(L) = σ1(T ) + σ1(B).
Solving these equations and taking into account that (σ1, σ2) ∈ ∆1 × ∆2 we ﬁnd that the
unique BRM equilibrium equals ((1
2
, 1
2
), (1, 0)). Observe that the weakly dominated action
is not only played with positive probability, but that there is not even an alternative action
with a higher probability.
The results with respect to the iterated elimination of never-best replies in Proposition
5 call to mind the notion of rationalizability introduced in Bernheim (1984) and Pearce
(1984). Without going into the formal deﬁnitions, it follows immediately from Proposition 5
and Bernheim (1984, pp1015-16) that every action that is played with positive probability in
a BRM equilibrium is rationalizable. However, in a BRM equilibrium σ, the mixed strategies
σi themselves need not be rationalizable. Consider for example the game in Figure 2. In
the unique BRM equilibrium of the game, ((1
2
, 1
2
), (1
2
, 1
2
, 0)), the mixed strategy of player 2
is strictly dominated by R. This shows that best-reply matching equilibrium is consistent
with rationality on the action level but may conﬂict with rationality on the level of mixed
strategies.
The game in Figure 2 indicates also that, despite the relatively prudent behavior with
respect to (weakly) dominated actions as expressed in Proposition 5, the set of BRM equi-
libria and Nash equilibria have no obvious relation. In the Nash equilibria of the game in
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L M R
T 0, 4 2, 0 1, 3
B 2, 0 0, 4 1, 3
Figure 2: Rationalizability
Figure 2 player one chooses T with probability p ∈ [1
4
, 3
4
] and player two chooses R with
probability one, while the unique BRM equilibrium equals ((1
2
, 1
2
), (1
2
, 1
2
, 0)).
It is, however, possible to indicate a relation with the notion of strict equilibria, introduced
by Harsanyi (1973) as those strategy proﬁles σ satisfying the condition that each player plays
his unique best reply to the strategies of the opponent:
∀i ∈ N : {σi} = {τi ∈ ∆i | ∃τ˜i : ui(τ˜i, σ−i) > ui(τi, σ−i)}.
It is clear that a strict Nash equilibrium is always a pure strategy Nash equilibrium and
(consequently) that strict Nash equilibria do not always exist. However, if they exist, they
are exactly the pure strategy BRM equilibria of the game.
Proposition 6 The set of strict Nash equilibria of a game 〈N, (Si)i∈N , (ui)i∈N〉 coincides
with the set of pure strategy BRM equilibria.
The proof is straightforward and therefore omitted.
From Proposition 6 it follows that a game can have more than one BRM equilibrium. A
typical example for such a case is a coordination game. A two-player game is a coordination
game if both players have the same set of actions and the unique best reply to an action
of the opponent is to play the same action. Figure 3 shows a well-known example of a
coordination game: the Battle of the Sexes.
boxing ballet
boxing 3, 2 0, 0
ballet 0, 0 2, 3
Figure 3: Battle of the Sexes
Obviously, in a coordination game a proﬁle of strategies is a BRM equilibrium if and
only if both players play the same mixed strategy. This illustrates an important diﬀerence
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from the Nash equilibrium concept. The pure Nash equilibria of a coordination game are the
combinations of pure strategies in which the players indeed coordinate (choose the same pure
strategy). Since these Nash equilibria are strict, they are also BRM equilibria. However,
there is a mixed strategy Nash equilibrium in which players do not coordinate exactly. In the
example above, the mixed strategy Nash equilibrium is ((3
5
, 2
5
), (2
5
, 3
5
)). This equilibrium is not
a BRM equilibrium, since it is not symmetric. For example, player 1 puts more probability on
boxing than he believes player 2 does, which is not in accordance with matching. Intuitively,
in a BRM equilibrium in order to avoid miscoordination players want to do exactly the same
as their opponent. If the opponent chooses boxing with probability p they will choose boxing
with the same probability.
The coordination game example shows that the set of BRM equilibria can be quite large.
More information about the size and structure of this set is therefore of interest.
With respect to Nash equilibrium it is known that in two-player games the set of Nash
equilibria has a nice decomposition into a ﬁnite number of polytopes (see, e.g., Winkels (1979)
and Jansen (1981)). Concerning the structure of the set of best-reply matching equilibria,
we see that if the game G has only two players, then BRM(G) is a polytope, since the
set of BRM equilibria is then determined by ﬁnitely many linear equations and linear weak
inequalities in the variables (σi(si))i∈N,si∈Si . If the game has at least three players, its set of
BRM equilibria is determined by a set of polynomial equations over a Cartesian product of
simplices. This leads to the observations that — analogous to the set of Nash equilibria —
the set of BRM equilibria may be curved or disconnected. See Voorneveld (1999, pp207-209)
for examples.
In general, the size of an equilibrium set is a measure of the cutting power of an equi-
librium concept: if an equilibrium set contains many candidates, it can be seen as a weak
concept, not ruling out many strategy proﬁles. With respect to the size of the set of BRM
equilibria of a game 〈N, (Si)i∈N , (i)i∈N〉, remark that it is always a strict subset of ∆. A
strategy tuple σ−i ∈ ∆−i completely determines ri(·, σ−i) (see Proposition 3) and hence in an
n-player game it suﬃces to know only n− 1 components of a BRM equilibrium to compute
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the equilibrium strategy for the remaining n-th player. This implies that BRM(G) is always
of lower dimension than ∆. In particular, it is impossible that BRM(G) = ∆.
For a two-player game G, the dimension of the polytope BRM(G) is related to the number
of minimal curb sets in the game.1 Curb sets were introduced by Basu and Weibull (1991).
In our set-up they can be deﬁned as follows. Fix a game G = 〈N, (Si)i∈N , (i)i∈N〉. For a
nonempty set C =
∏
i∈N Ci with Ci ⊆ Si for each i ∈ N , write B(C) =
∏
i∈N(∪s∈CBi(s−i)).
A curb set of G is a product set C =
∏
i∈N Ci with Ci ⊆ Si nonempty for each i ∈ N and
B(C) ⊆ C. In other words, a curb set is a nonempty product set C of actions, containing
all best replies against action proﬁles in the set C itself. A curb set is minimal if it does not
properly contain an other curb set. Let C(G) denote the collection of minimal curb sets of
G. Since S =
∏
i∈N Si is a curb set and there are only ﬁnitely many curb sets because S is
ﬁnite, it follows that C(G) = ∅.
Let G = 〈N, (Si)i∈N , (i)i∈N〉 be a two-player game. For convenience, write S1 =
{e1, . . . , em} and S2 = {f1, . . . , fn}. By (2), a BRM equilibrium σ of G satisﬁes:
∀ei ∈ S1 : σ1(ei) =
∑m
j=1 aijσ2(fj),
∀fj ∈ S2 : σ2(fj) =
∑n
i=1 bjiσ1(ei),
where aij =
1
|BR1(fj)| if ei is a best reply against action fj of player 2, and aij = 0 otherwise.
The numbers bji are deﬁned analogously. Regarding σ as an element of R
|S1|+|S2| = Rm+n
and switching to matrix notation, this means that σ = Mσ, where
A := (aij) ∈ Rm×n, B := (bji) ∈ Rn×m, and M :=

 0 A
B 0

 ∈ R(m+n)×(m+n).
So σ is a ﬁxed point of M . Since the columns of M add up to one, its transpose MT
is a stochastic matrix and can be considered as the transition matrix of a (ﬁnite state,
discrete time) Markov process. In this Markov process, the states are the m + n actions in
S1 ∪ S2 and two states communicate with each other if and only if there is a sequence of
1Intuitively: a polytope is the convex hull of finitely many extreme points. The weight assigned to all
but one of these extreme points determines the weight on the final point, so the dimension of a polytope is
its number of extreme points minus one.
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best replies connecting each of these two states with the other. Hence, a communicating
class (an equivalence class with respect to the communication relation) corresponds with a
minimal curb set and the matrix MT is irreducible if and only if the entire strategy space is
a minimal curb set. Notice, moreover, that the communicating classes (corresponding with
the minimal curb sets) are recurrent: once the process enters a communicating class, it will
never leave it.
Since a BRM equilibrium satisﬁes σ = Mσ, it corresponds (up to normalization, since
the m + n coordinates of the vector σ ∈ ∆(S1)×∆(S2) add up to two instead of one) with
an invariant distribution of the Markov process. This prepares us for the following result.
Proposition 7 Let G = 〈N, (Si)i∈N , (i)i∈N〉 be a two-player game.
(i) Every minimal curb set C ∈ C(G) contains the support of a unique BRM equilibrium
of G.
(ii) The dimension of the polytope BRM(G) equals |C(G)| − 1.
Proof. (i): Let C = C1×C2 ∈ C(G) be a minimal curb set. The (|C1|+ |C2|)× (|C1|+ |C2|)
matrix MT associated with the subgame H = 〈N, (Ci)i∈N , (i)i∈N〉 that is obtained from G
by restricting attention to the strategy sets (Ci)i∈N is irreducible, since its strategy space C
is a minimal curb set. Consequently, the associated Markov process has a unique stationary
distribution. Since every BRM equilibrium, after normalization, gives rise to an invariant
distribution of MT , the BRM equilibrium σ∗ of H, which exists by Proposition 3, must be
unique. Since C is closed under rational behavior, σ∗ is also a BRM equilibrium of G.
(ii): The invariant distributions of the stochastic matrix MT associated with the game
G are convex combinations of the extreme invariant distributions corresponding with the
recurrent communicating classes of the Markov process (cf. Karlin and Taylor (1975)). The
recurrent communicating classes correspond with the |C(G)| minimal curb sets of the game,
which each contain the support of a unique BRM equilibrium by part (i) of the proposition,
so the polytope BRM(G) has |C(G)| extreme points and consequently dimension |C(G)|−1.

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5 Centipede game
The BRM equilibrium concept can be applied to the reduced strategic form of an extensive
form game. This section discusses a T -choice centipede game. In the T -choice centipede
game, introduced by Rosenthal (1981), players 1 and 2 alternately move. In any of the
2T periods, the player whose turn it is to move can decide to stop the game (S) or to
continue (C). Consequently, both players have T + 1 actions: stopping at any one of the T
opportunities, or continue all the time. The game ends if one of the players decides to stop
or if neither player has decided to do so after each of them has had T opportunities. For
each player, the outcome when he stops the game in period t is better than that in which the
other player stops the game in period t+1 (or the game ends), but worse than any outcome
that is reached if in period t + 1 the other player continues. Therefore:
Player 2’s action to stop at his k-th opportunity is a best reply to the following actions of
player 1:
• player 1 stops immediately; then all of player 2’s T + 1 actions are a best reply;
• if k = T the unique best reply to player 1’s choice to continue always is to stop at the
final stage;
• player 1 decides to stop at opportunity k + 1.
Player 1’s action to stop at his k-th opportunity is a best reply to exactly one action of player
2:
• player 2 decides to stop in the next period, at his k-th opportunity.
An example of a 3-choice centipede game is given in Figure 4.
Denote by pi[qi] the probability of player 1[2] to stop at his i-th opportunity, once this
opportunity is reached (i = 1, . . . , T ). Thus, our computations are in behavioral, rather than
in mixed strategies. We show in the appendix that the unique BRM equilibrium satisﬁes for
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 6, 5
Figure 4: A 3-choice centipede game
each number T ∈ N of choices and each k ∈ {0, . . . , T − 1}:
pT−k = qT−k =
2
k + 3
. (5)
In particular, if the number of choices T approaches inﬁnity, the probability for each player
to stop at the ﬁrst (and by the same argument at any ﬁnite) opportunity, converges to zero.
The intuition for this result is as follows. In the centipede game it is a best reply for
each player to stop exactly one period before the opponent. Hence every action of each
player is a best reply to at least one action of the other player. In addition, every action of
player 2 is a best reply to player 1’s action to stop at his ﬁrst opportunity. Since the full
action space is the unique minimal curb set of the game, by Proposition 7 we have a unique
BRM equilibrium and, furthermore, in equilibrium every action of each player is played with
positive probability. In the appendix we show that probabilities pi must increase.
The solution in (5) indicates that players continue with positive probability at every
node, but the probability to stop increases as players reach further nodes in the game.
This feature is mentioned as the most obvious and consistent pattern in the experimental
study of McKelvey and Palfrey (1992), who remark that “any model to explain the data
should capture this basic feature” (McKelvey and Palfrey (1992, p809)). Thus, while no
standard game theoretic solution concept can predict this outcome, the best-reply matching
equilibrium concept does a good job. Moreover, the surprising result that a player continues
with positive probability at his ﬁnal node, even though this action is strictly dominated by
stopping at that node, is observed in the experimental sessions of McKelvey and Palfrey as
well. Nagel and Tang (1998), in an experimental analysis of the centipede game in normal
form, observe the same behavioral patterns as McKelvey and Palfrey (1992).
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6 Conclusion
Best-reply matching behavior induces a new equilibrium concept in non-cooperative games.
In this paper we showed that every ﬁnite n-player non-cooperative game possesses at least one
best-reply matching equilibrium and that in two-player games best-reply matching equilibria
are uniquely contained in the faces of the minimal curb sets of the game. Pure strategies
that receive positive weight in a best-reply matching equilibrium are rationalizable but the
equilibrium mixed strategy may fail to be rationalizable.
We proved that the reduced normal form of the centipede game has a unique best-reply
matching equilibrium, where each player continues with positive probability at every node
but the probability to stop increases as players reach further nodes of the game. Moreover,
as the number of nodes goes to inﬁnity the probability to stop at any ﬁxed node converges
to zero. This prediction coincides with experimental evidence, suggesting that best-reply
matching can be a powerful solution concept.
Several potential issues for future work remain. For example, more empirical evidence is
needed to determine the extent to which matching behavior actually occurs in normal-form
games. Another direction is to make the concept applicable directly to games in extensive
form, without seeking recourse to the reduced normal-form game, as was done in Section
5. Finally, the development of a cardinal equilibrium concept presents a path worth to be
taken. So far best-reply matching equilibrium is an ordinal concept: players only need to
know the best-reply structure of the game, which makes the concept applicable to a wide
class of games. It would be interesting to consider cardinal equilibrium concepts based on
the matching principle in games where the players have clearly speciﬁed von Neumann-
Morgenstern utility functions.
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Appendix
We prove that the T -choice centipede game has a unique BRM equilibrium, which satisﬁes
the condition that pT−k = qT−k = 2k+3 for k ∈ {0, . . . , T − 1} and T ∈ N.
The description of the T -choice centipede game in terms of best replies (emphasized
above) immediately gives rise to the following conditions for player 1:
p1 = q1 (I.1)
(1− p1)p2 = (1− q1)q2 (I.2)
· · ·
(1− p1)(1− p2) · · · (1− pT−1)pT = (1− q1)(1− q2) · · · (1− qT−1)qT , (I.T)
and for player 2:
q1 =
p1
T + 1
+ (1− p1)p2 (II.1)
(1− q1)q2 = p1
T + 1
+ (1− p1)(1− p2)p3 (II.2)
· · ·
(1− q1)(1− q2) · · · (1− qT−2)qT−1 = p1
T + 1
+ (1− p1)(1− p2) · · · (1− pT−1)pT (II.T− 1)
(1− q1)(1− q2) · · · (1− qT−1)qT = p1
T + 1
+ (1− p1)(1− p2) · · · (1− pT ). (II.T)
The conditions that arise from always continuing are redundant (see Remark 4).
We prove ﬁrst of all, that in the T -choice centipede game we have for each i = 1, . . . , T−1:
pi = qi, pi /∈ {0, 1}. (6)
This is necessary to avoid division by zero when we solve the game. We know from condition
(I.1) that p1 = q1. Suppose p1 = 1. Substitution in (II.1) yields 1 =
1
T+1
, a contradiction.
Suppose p1 = 0. Then p2 = q2 by (I.2) and p2 = 0 by (II.1). Hence p3 = q3 by (I.3) and
p3 = 0 by (II.2). Proceeding in this fashion yields that pk = qk = 0 for all k = 1, . . . , T ,
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which contradicts (II.T). Hence p1 = q1, p1 /∈ {0, 1}. Now assume that we have shown for
some k ∈ {1, . . . , T − 2}
∀n ≤ k : pn = qn, pn /∈ {0, 1}.
We proceed to show that the same holds for k + 1. First of all, we have from (I.k+1) that
pk+1 = qk+1. Consider condition (II.k+1):
(1− q1)(1− q2) · · · (1− qk)qk+1 = p1
T + 1
+ (1− p1)(1− p2) · · · (1− pk+1)pk+2︸ ︷︷ ︸
≥0
.
If qk+1 = 0, then its left hand side equals zero, which would imply that p1 ≤ 0, whereas we
know from the above that p1 > 0. If pk+1 = 1, condition (II.k+2) reduces to
0 =
p1
T + 1
,
a contradiction. This ﬁnishes the proof of (6). This part was necessary to avoid division by
zero in the following solution of the game.
Substitute the left-hand side of player 1’s conditions in the left-hand side of player 2’s
conditions. This yields
p1 =
p1
T + 1
+ (1− p1)p2
(1− p1)p2 = p1
T + 1
+ (1− p1)(1− p2)p3
· · ·
(1− p1)(1− p2) · · · (1− pT−1)pT = p1
T + 1
+ (1− p1)(1− p2) · · · (1− pT )
Obviously, the ﬁrst equation is equivalent to
T
T + 1
p1 = (1− p1)p2.
Using this equality to replace the left-hand side of the second equation leads to
T
T + 1
p1 =
p1
T + 1
+ (1− p1)(1− p2)p3,
which is equivalent to
T − 1
T + 1
p1 = (1− p1)(1− p2)p3.
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Use this equation, again, in order to replace the left-hand side of the third equation. This
leads to
T − 2
T + 1
p1 = (1− p1)(1− p2)(1− p3)p4.
Continuing in this way, we get the following equivalent system of T equations:
T
T + 1
p1 = (1− p1)p2
T − 1
T + 1
p1 = (1− p1)(1− p2)p3
· · ·
2
T + 1
p1 = (1− p1)(1− p2) · · · (1− pT−1)pT
1
T + 1
p1 = (1− p1)(1− p2) · · · (1− pT−1)(1− pT ).
The ﬁnal step is to roll it up backwards again. Add the last and the second last equation to
get
3
T + 1
p1 = (1− p1)(1− p2) · · · (1− pT−1). (7)
In combination with the second last equation and (6), which assures that we do not divide
by zero, this immediately leads to
pT =
2
3
.
Now start with equation (7) and ﬁrst, add the third last equation, and second, divide in a
similar way. This yields ﬁrst,
6
T + 1
p1 = (1− p1)(1− p2) · · · (1− pT−2), (8)
and second,
pT−1 =
3
6
=
1
2
.
Now do this again with equation (8) in combination with the fourth last equation and get
10
T + 1
p1 = (1− p1)(1− p2) · · · (1− pT−3),
and so
pT−2 =
4
10
=
2
5
.
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This procedure stops when reaching the ﬁrst equation, thereby generating the following
sequence of probabilities:
2
3
,
1
2
,
2
5
,
1
3
,
2
7
,
1
4
, · · ·
It is easy to see that
∀T ∈ N,∀k ∈ {0, . . . , T − 1} : pT−k = qT−k = 2
k + 3
.
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